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I. INTRODUCTION
Days before his death, southern Arizona rancher Robert Krentz
found large quantities of illegal drugs on his 35,000-acre farm and re-
ported it to the police.1  On March 27, 2010, Krentz was shot and
killed by an unknown assailant while he worked on an isolated corner
 Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law–Fayetteville.
The author would like to thank Adam Bailey for his invaluable research assis-
tance.  The author would also like to thank his wife for her unending patience in
discussing this topic.
** Associate Professor of Law & Immigration Law Clinic Director, University of Ar-
kansas School of Law–Fayetteville.  The author would also like to thank Adam
Bailey for his assistance.
1. Philip S. Moore, Border Fight: Murdered Rancher Who Helped Immigrants
Spurred on Arizona Law, NAT’L CATH. REG., May 9, 2010, http://www.ncregister.
com/register_exclusives/border_fight/ (reporting the size of his ranch); Linda Cha-
vez, Arizona Mythbusting, PARAGOULD DAILY PRESS, May 4, 2010, http://www.
paragoulddailypress.com/articles/2010/05/04/opinion/doc4be06f86c406843694175
2.txt (reporting that Krentz contacted the authorities).
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\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB409.txt unknown Seq: 2 21-JUL-11 12:30
710 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:709
of the ranch.2  Many speculated that the assailant who killed Krentz
was in the country illegally, and,3 for many, Krentz’s death justified
associating the immigration issue with danger.4
Three weeks later, the Governor of Arizona had the Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (the Act or the Arizona
Act) on her desk.5  Otherwise known as SB 1070, the patchwork set of
laws makes it a misdemeanor to lack proper immigration paperwork
in Arizona.6  More controversially, the Act also enables officers who
develop a “reasonable suspicion” to believe that someone is undocu-
mented to stop that individual and determine the person’s immigra-
tion status.7  An individual’s inability to provide government-issued
identification proving legal residency, such as a driver’s license, sub-
jects that individual to twenty days in jail for the first violation (thirty
for subsequent violations) and a fine of up to $100 plus jail costs.8  In
an effort to soften the Act’s obvious ethnic and racial implications, it
expressly states that “[a] law enforcement official or agency of this
state or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state
may not solely consider race, color or national origin in implementing
the requirements of this subsection except to the extent permitted by
the United States or Arizona Constitution.”9
Public response to the Act has been extreme and appeared from
unlikely sources.  Arizona’s professional basketball team, the Phoenix
Suns, wore their orange “Los Suns” jerseys on May 5, 2010, in the
second game of their playoff series against the San Antonio Spurs in
2. Moore, supra note 1.
3. Specifically, law enforcement believes that an illegal immigrant who was headed
to Mexico and worked as a scout for drug smugglers may have killed Krentz.
Jacques Billeaud, Official:  Suspect in AZ Ranch Death Recently in US, LAKE
WYLIE PILOT, May 3, 2010, http://www.lakewyliepilot.com/2010/05/03/714474/
official-suspect-in-az-ranch-death.html.
4. See Michael J. O’Neal, The Arizona Immigration Law:  Some Things You Proba-
bly Didn’t Know About Arizona Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (May 3, 2010, 8:41
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-j-o/the-arizona-immigration-l_b_
561924.html (“While it is likely that the perpetrator was involved in drugs or
smuggling (groups who are known to carry weapons) rather than manual work-
ers who comprise the vast majority of illegal immigration (and who are not
known to carry weapons), this distinction could easily be lost in the wave of public
sympathy and outrage at a senseless murder.”); see also Dennis Wagner, Arizona
Rancher’s Slaying Sparks Debate Over Illegal Immigration, AZ CENTRAL.COM
(Mar. 29, 2010, 6:52 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/03/29/
20100329rancher-killed-at-arizona-ranch.html (“The unsolved murder Saturday
of a soft-spoken rancher in southern Arizona has become a new flashpoint in the
debate over illegal immigration . . . .”).
5. O’Neal, supra note 4.
6. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(H) (2010).
7. Id. § 11-1051(B).
8. Id. § 13-1509(H).
9. Id. § 11-1051(B).
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part to express opposition to the new Arizona immigration law.10  In a
press release issued before the game, the Suns’ owner, Robert Sarver,
suggested that “frustration with the federal government’s failure to
deal with the issue of illegal immigration resulted in passage of a
flawed state law.”11
Major League Baseball has also protested the law.  Approximately
27% of Major League Baseball players are Latino, and nearly half of
the teams hold their spring training camps in Arizona.12  Protestors
turned out to Wrigley Field in Chicago to rally against the Act just
before the Chicago Cubs were set to take on the Arizona
Diamondbacks.13  Given the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion’s opposition to the Act, there is growing speculation that fans will
boycott the MLB’s 2011 All-Star game—currently scheduled in
Phoenix.14
Of course, the athletic community is hardly alone in voicing dis-
pleasure with the Act.  Rallies nationwide—including in New York,
Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Denver—have unified thousands in
favor of federal immigration reform and to protest the passage of the
Arizona Act.15  University of Arizona students have pressed the uni-
versity’s president, Robert N. Shelton, to publicly denounce the Act
and, in doing so, have noted that “[t]he families of a number of out-of-
state students (to date all of them honors students) have told us that
they are changing their plans and will be sending their children to
universities in other states.”16  Moreover, city councils in Oakland and
10. Dan Bickley, Phoenix Suns Owner’s Bold Statement on Immigration Changes Fo-
cus of Game 2, AZ CENTRAL.COM (May 4, 2010, 6:50 PM), http://www.azcentral.
com/sports/suns/articles/2010/05/04/20100504phoenix-suns-immigration-law-
bickley.html#ixzz0n4FIxxXD.
11. J.A. Adande, Suns Using Jerseys to Send Message, ESPN.COM (May 7, 2010, 9:48
AM) http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/playoffs/2010/columns/story?columnist=
adande_ja&page=sarver-100504.
12. Akito Yoshikane, Baseball Union and Players Speak Out Against SB1070, IN
THESE TIMES (May 5, 2010, 12:59 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/
5943/baseball_union_and_players_speak_out_against_sb1070/.
13. Kevin Baxter, Consequences Could Follow Illegal Immigration Law: New York
Congressman Calls For Major League Baseball to Put 2011 All-Star Game From
Arizona, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-29/
sports/ct-spt-0430-arizona-baseball—20100429_1_immigration-law-major-league
-baseball-arizona-gov.
14. Id.
15. Rallies Across U.S. Protest Arizona Law, CBSNEWS (May 3, 2010, 12:50 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/01/national/main6450616.shtml
16. Lauren Burgoyne, University of Arizona Students Hosting Rally at U of A Mall,
KOLD NEWS13 (May 12, 2010, 4:04 AM), http://www.kold.com/Global/story.asp?
S=12429950.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB409.txt unknown Seq: 4 21-JUL-11 12:30
712 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:709
San Francisco have voted to economically boycott Arizona.17  Other
cities are actively contemplating doing the same.18
Perhaps most importantly, however, the federal judiciary recently
weighed in by enjoining enforcement of most of the Act.19  United
States District Court Judge Susan R. Bolton found that “preserving
the status quo through a preliminary injunction is less harmful than
allowing state laws that are likely preempted by federal law to be en-
forced.”20  By enjoining enforcement of the Act on preemption
grounds, the accompanying Fourth Amendment issue remains
unresolved.
Preemption aside, the Act seems to suggest that “driving while
black”21 is out with the 2000s, and in Arizona “driving (or breathing?)
while brown” is now “in.”22  Are citizens therefore no longer concerned
with law enforcement profiling African-Americans?  Of course not.23
17. Stephanie Condon, More City Councils Move Toward Arizona Boycotts Over Im-
migration Law, CBS NEWS (Apr, 29, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-503544_162-20003803-503544.html.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010),
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100729_ARI
ZONA_DOC.pdf.
20. Id. at 35.  The court enjoined the following sections: (1) requiring officers to make
a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a detained person if
there is a reasonable suspicion that the person unlawfully present in the U.S., id.
at 4, 36 (enjoining section 2(B), creating A.R.S. § 11-1051 (B)); (2) creating a
crime for the failure to apply for or carry registration papers, id. (enjoining sec-
tion 3, creating A.R.S. § 13-1509); (3) creating a crime for unauthorized aliens to
solicit, apply for, or perform work, id. (enjoining the portion of section 5, creating
A.R.S. § 13-2928 (C)); and  (4) authorizing the warrantless arrest of a person
when there is probable cause to believe that person has committed a public of-
fense that makes the person removable from the United States, id. (enjoining
section 6, creating A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(5)).
21. See generally David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Of-
fenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 544 (1997).
22. Conservative lawmakers in Oklahoma say they will introduce a bill similar to the
Arizona Act in their state.  One Republican state representative even told the
Associated Press that Oklahoma may take Arizona’s example further by includ-
ing asset seizure provisions and harsher penalties.  Ethan Sacks, Battle Over Ari-
zona’s SB 1070:  Oklahoma Eyes Similar Immigration Law; City Councils Eye
Boycotts, NY DAILY NEWS, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/2010/04/30/2010-04-30_battle_over_arizonas_sb_1070_oklahoma_eyes_
similar_immigration_law_city_councils.html.  Oklahoma is not alone in possibly
following Arizona. See Ryan Takeo, Mich Fruit Pickers Oppose AZ-style law:
‘Take Our Jobs’ Challenge Set for July 24, WOOD TV8 (July 12, 2010, 11:05 AM),
http://www.woodtv.com/dpp/news/local/grand_rapids/Mich-fruit-pickers-oppose-
AZ-style-law (“[Michigan] House Bill 6526 allows police officers to arrest and de-
tain people with sufficient reasonable suspicion they are in the country
illegally.”).
23. Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy of Jim Crow: The Enduring Taboo of Black–White
Romance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 739, 761 (2006) (book review) (commenting that “racial
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The Arizona Act merely serves to continue an effort—this time at the
legislative level—to broaden the discretionary power of law enforce-
ment.  Yet, a fascinating question lies at the base of the public’s perva-
sive criticism of the Act:  where have all of you people been?
Numerous Supreme Court cases already allow for law enforcement to
engage in the very practice—racial and ethnic profiling premised on
“reasonable suspicion”24—that has incited the emotions of so many
profiling remains a problem in the United States today”); see Al Baker, New York
Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1 (reporting
that an analysis of the 2009 raw data by the Center for Constitutional Rights
revealed that nearly 490,000 blacks and Latinos were stopped by the police on
the streets last year, compared with 53,000 whites).
24. Given the focus in this Article on reasonable suspicion, it does not consider other
powerful judicial doctrines that expand law enforcement discretion—most nota-
bly, the Court’s “special needs” jurisprudence.”  The “special needs” rule allows
for suspicionless searches when “ ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and[/or] probable-cause requirement[s] impracti-
cable.’”  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).  To determine the
validity of policy or law allowing for a suspicionless search, the Supreme Court
applies a “general Fourth Amendment approach” to determine reasonableness
“by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843, 848 (2006).  Relying on this analysis, the Court has upheld, inter alia, the
following suspicionless Fourth Amendment intrusions as constitutional: (1) high-
way checkpoint stops during which officers ask citizens about a recent crime, Illi-
nois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004); (2) sobriety checkpoints, Mich. Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); (3) brief seizures of motorists at
border patrol checkpoints, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562
(1976); (4) certain work-related searches by government employers of employees’
desks and offices, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987); (5) school officials
searching some student property, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985);
and (6) some governmental searches conducted pursuant to a regulatory scheme,
see, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987) (upholding a New York
law requiring junkyard owners to maintain records for routine spontaneous in-
spections by police officers and state agents); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
602 (1981) (upholding a statute that enabled federal mine inspectors to inspect
mining company’s quarries without a search warrant); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1972) (upholding gun-control law allowing for warrantless
“compliance checks” of individuals who were federally licensed to deal in sporting
weapons); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539–40 (1967) (finding unconsti-
tutional a city ordinance that gave city building inspectors the right to enter any
building at reasonable times in furtherance of their code-enforcement duties).
Given that government’s “general interest in crime control” will not justify a sus-
picionless search, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000), the
Supreme Court upholds certain laws pursuant to the special-needs doctrine when
there exists “no law enforcement purpose behind the searches” and “there [is]
little, if any, entanglement with law enforcement,” Ferguson v. City of Charles-
ton, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n.15 (2001).
Perhaps most importantly for purposes of this footnote, the Court has also
upheld routine investigatory searches of cars and personal effects of arrestees,
Colordo v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1987), and routine suspicionless
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citizens nationwide.  Thus, regardless of whether the Act is pre-
empted, the very conduct codified by the Act and objectionable to so
many is already condoned by a series of Supreme Court cases.
This Article therefore argues that the Arizona Act, while notable
for the public response to it, is merely emblematic of a much larger
and systemic problem that exists because of the collective core hold-
ings from several Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases.  Indeed,
law enforcement stops of persons lawfully present in the United
States using an “illegal immigrant” profile existed before the Act and
will remain permissible regardless of the Act’s ultimate fate.  Part I of
this Article compiles and synthesizes varied Supreme Court cases that
bestow upon local law enforcement an inordinate amount of discre-
tionary law enforcement power both on the street and in an automo-
bile.  Part II offers a primer on immigration law in order to thereafter
explain what exactly is illegal about being an “illegal immigrant.”  It
also considers the available law enforcement agencies—both federal
and state—charged with enforcing immigration law.  Part III con-
tends that the combination of law enforcement tools and immigration
consequences provides law enforcement with a level of power and dis-
cretion comparable to that bestowed by the Arizona Act.  That power,
Part III asserts, allows for the pervasive de facto or express creation of
an “illegal immigrant” profile and a corresponding propensity by law
enforcement to stop individuals or cars using that profile.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICER DISCRETION
This Part seeks to non-exhaustively synthesize several Supreme
Court cases that, when applied at the border, equal or exceed the level
of discretion bestowed upon officers by the Arizona Act.  In doing so,
section II.A first considers notable Supreme Court cases that apply
nationwide—without regard to a suspect’s relationship to the border.
Then, section II.B briefly reviews a handful of border-specific Supreme
Court cases.
A. Cases of Nationwide Applicability
To be clear at the outset, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution serves as the limitation on the government’s abil-
ity to impede or otherwise limit citizens’ freedom of movement.25
Within the context of stopping a vehicle or detaining a citizen on the
street, the first question is whether, during that stop or detention, of-
ficers have “seized” the individual within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.  The importance of that question cannot be overstated;
searches at the border of persons and their effects, United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
25. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
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indeed, if the police activity is not a “seizure,” then the Fourth Amend-
ment simply does not apply to the governmental conduct.26
Unlike the word “search,” which has only one constitutional defini-
tion,27 the word “seizure” has two:  one that relates to property and
the other that relates to the seizure of persons.28  In the case of per-
sons, law enforcement must have adequate cause to seize an individ-
ual, and, in the specific case of an in-home arrest, officers must
ordinarily possess an arrest warrant.29  Regardless of whether an ar-
rest warrant is required, however, an arrest or its functional
equivalent must be supported by probable cause.30
The Court has, however, also held that circumstances short of an
arrest may constitute a less intrusive seizure, subject to a less strin-
gent level of Fourth Amendment review.  In the context of of-
ficer–citizen encounters, a person has been “seized” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circum-
stances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave.31  Assuming a person has been seized within the meaning of
that definition, the question ordinarily shifts to determining whether
law enforcement had a sufficient justification—i.e., probable cause—
for detaining the citizen.
Yet, in 1968, the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio32 made
constitutional certain limited intrusions on a person’s liberty based on
something less than probable cause.33  Specifically, under Terry, an
officer may stop an individual based on “reasonable suspicion” to be-
lieve that criminal activity is afoot.34  In defining reasonable suspi-
cion, the Court held the officer “need not be absolutely certain the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonable prudent man in
26. E.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984).
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining
a “search” as police conduct that invades a person’s subjective expectation of pri-
vacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”).
28. Compare Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (“A seizure of property occurs when ‘there is some
meaningful interference with an individuals’ possessory interests in that prop-
erty.’” (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added)), with United States v. Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (“[A] person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of
physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.”
(emphasis added)).
29. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–89 (1980).
30. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
31. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  Al-
though to some extent outside the scope of this Article, an uncomplied with re-
quest to stop is not a seizure.  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).  A
suspect who continues to flee after an officer yells “stop” has therefore not been
“seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id.  On the other hand, a submission
to that show of force is a seizure. Id.
32. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 30.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB409.txt unknown Seq: 8 21-JUL-11 12:30
716 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:709
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger.”35  If nothing during that stop dispels
the officer’s suspicion, then he may likewise engage in a limited pat
down of the suspect’s outer clothing.36
Notably, Terry provided the impetus, as well as the framework, for
a stronger move by the Supreme Court away from the proposition that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable37 and toward the com-
peting view that the Fourth Amendment requires evaluating “the rea-
sonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental
invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”38  In other words, warrant-
35. Id. at 27.
36. Id. (noting that a frisk is permissible if there exists “the more immediate interest
of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him”).
37. The Supreme Court’s early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence resoundingly sug-
gested that searches conducted without a warrant were presumptively “unrea-
sonable.” See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1964); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610, 614 (1961) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.”); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (“The decisions of this
Court have time and again underscored the essential purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.”).
That position was forcefully reaffirmed by the Court’s 1967 decision in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), wherein it observed that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 357.  Although the Court
in the following two decades approved more exceptions to the warrant “require-
ment,” see, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (allowing for war-
rantless searches of an arrestee’s car post-arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 242–43 (1973) (allowing for warrantless searches premised on an
individual’s consent); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (allowing
for warrantless searches incident to arrest), it continued to periodically highlight
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause as the predominant clause, see, e.g.,
Belton, 453 U.S. at 457 (“It is a first principle of the Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neu-
tral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so.”); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
219 (“It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a
search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unrea-
sonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions.’”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (observing
“the general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be
dispensed with”) (citation omitted).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.  Perhaps the truest precursor to the Court’s “reasonable-
ness” jurisprudence came in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
wherein the Court held that warrantless searches incident to arrest are constitu-
tional. Id. at 65–66.  In doing so, the Court noted that the appropriate test of
police conduct “is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable.” Id. at 66.
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less police conduct became much easier to justify after Terry.  The bot-
tom line is hopefully reasonably clear:  the Court no longer treats all
searches and all seizures alike.  Further, as a result of Terry, many on-
the-street encounters between police and citizens that do not involve
arrests or full-blown searches come within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and are lawful notwithstanding the absence of a warrant
or probable cause.
The question then becomes whether Terry’s reach extends to scena-
rios other than citizen–police encounters on the street.  In 1990, the
Court made clear in Alabama v. White39 that the concept of “reasona-
ble suspicion” applies to car stops.  In White, police received an anony-
mous tip indicating that a woman would leave a particular apartment
building at a particular time and would drive to a particular motel.40
After corroborating the place and time of the woman’s departure, of-
ficers stopped her car as she drove in the hotel’s direction.41  The
Court held that the combination of the anonymous tip and the police
corroboration established sufficient indicia of reliability to constitute a
reasonable suspicion and thus permit an investigative stop.42
Knowing now that reasonable suspicion reaches both street en-
counters and car stops, the question turns to how officers can generate
“reasonable suspicion.”  We know that a suspect’s flight,43 a suspect’s
avoidance of a checkpoint,44 a suspect’s presence in a “high crime”
neighborhood,45 or an informant’s tip,46 are all factors that could pro-
vide an officer with reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activ-
ity is afoot.  Yet, asked differently (and more dramatically), could
racist officers lawfully initiate a race-based stop predicated on proba-
ble cause—or reasonable suspicion—to believe that the driver commit-
ted a non-criminal traffic violation?  The answer is yes.  Whichever
standard governs—whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion—
the Court has specifically stated that the subjective intentions of the
police officer do not alter Fourth Amendment analysis.47
In United States v. Whren,48 plainclothes vice-squad officers were
patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington, D.C., in an unmarked
39. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
40. Id. at 327.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 332.
43. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 66–67 (1968).
44. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 271 (2002).
45. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972).
46. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
47. United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
48. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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car.49  They watched the petitioners’ vehicle sit at an intersection for
what seemed to the officers to be an unusually long time.50  When the
officers turned their car around toward the petitioners, the vehicle
suddenly turned right without signaling and sped off.51  Officers
stopped the vehicle and seized two large bags of crack cocaine.52
The petitioners subsequently challenged the legality of their car
stop, arguing that it was not justified by probable cause, or even rea-
sonable suspicion, to believe that the petitioners were engaged in ille-
gal drug activity.53  Moreover, they contended allowing officers to rely
on suspected traffic violations as a basis to stop a motorist could cre-
ate “the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating
other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable
suspicion exists,” and would allow officers to base stops on impermis-
sible factors, like race.54  Accordingly, they argued that in the context
of traffic stops the Fourth Amendment test should be whether a police
officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the specific
reason given, rather than simply whether probable cause existed gen-
erally.55  The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument and stated, in
part, the following:
We think [cases cited by the Court] foreclose any argument that the constitu-
tional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the
individual officer involved.  We of course agree with the petitioners that the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considera-
tions such as race.  But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of the law is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment.  Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis.56
How far does that language extend?  Although the Court phrased the
last sentence narrowly in terms of probable cause, the first sentence
demonstrates its true breadth:  actual motivations of the individual
officer are not a factor in the reasonableness of all traffic stops—re-
49. Id. at 808.  Notably, a few years after Whren, a cover story in the Washington City
Paper detailed the many transgressions of Officer Soto—one of the arresting of-
ficers in Whren—including excessive force, incredible preliminary hearing testi-
mony, falsified police reports, and witness coaching. See generally Jason Cherkis,
Rough Justice: How Four Vice Officers Served as Judge and Jury on the Streets of
MPD’s 6th District, WASH. CITY PAPER, Jan. 7–13, 2000, available at http://www.
washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/18752/rough-justice.
50. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 809.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 810.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 813.
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gardless of whether those stops were based on probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion.57
B. A Few Border-Specific Cases
With Terry, White, and Whren firmly in mind, let’s now direct our
attention more specifically to how those cases operate on the border.
To begin with, and let’s be crystal clear, the functional equivalent of
the Arizona Act has been around nationwide since 1975.  In United
States v. Brigoni-Ponce,58 the Court held that officers on roving patrol
may constitutionally stop a vehicle if they have “reasonable suspicion”
to believe “that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the
country.”59  Most importantly, though, Brigoni-Ponce provided a list of
possible factors that, if present, would support a finding of reasonable
suspicion (and look an awful lot like an “illegal immigrant” profile).
Those factors include: (1) the area of the stop and its relation to the
border; (2) aspects of the vehicle itself (like those with large compart-
ments); (3) whether the vehicle appears to be heavily loaded; and (4)
“the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on
such factors as the mode of dress and haircut.”60
With that digression complete, we return to post-Whren doctrine
and the Court’s 2002 decision in United States v. Arvizu.61  In Arvizu,
a border patrol agent stopped the respondent as he drove on an un-
paved road in a desolate area of southeastern Arizona.62  A subse-
57. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (ignoring an officer’s subjec-
tive motivations in the context of reasonable suspicion analysis); see United
States v. Callaraman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001) (“When determining
whether an officer possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion, the subjective
motivations of an arresting officer are irrelevant.” (citations omitted)).  The abil-
ity of law enforcement to make pretextual stops is particularly powerful given
their corresponding abilities to conduct a search incident to arrest for minor traf-
fic offenses (even where the state law does not require an arrest for such an of-
fense), Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973), and arrest persons for
misdemeanors punishable by only a fine, Atwater v. City of Largo Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 354 (2001).
58. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
59. Id. at 884.  Prior to Brigoni-Ponce, the Court had held in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States that roving patrols required a warrant or probable cause to search
vehicles at points removed from the border or its functional equivalent.  413 U.S.
266, 272–73 (1973).  The Court in Brigoni-Ponce did not overrule Almeida-
Sanchez; instead it electing to distinguish Almeida-Sanchez on the basis that
Brigoni-Ponce dealt only with the Border Patrol’s authority to question vehicle
occupants about their immigration status but not their authority to search vehi-
cles.  422 U.S. at 874.
60. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885–87 (noting “[t]he likelihood that any given person
of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor”) (emphasis added).
61. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
62. Id. at 268.
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quent search of his vehicle revealed more than 100 pounds of
marijuana.63  Several factors supported the border patrol agent’s deci-
sion to stop the vehicle, including that:  (1) it triggered a sensor along
a roadway often traveled by individuals seeking to avoid checkpoints;
(2) respondent was driving a minivan; (3) it slowed dramatically when
the agent neared; (4) it contained five occupants; (5) the driver ap-
peared stiff and did not look at the agent; (6) the knees of the two
children sitting in the very back seat were unusually high; (7) the chil-
dren in the vehicle simultaneously waved at the agent; and (8) the
vehicle was registered in an area notorious for alien and narcotics
smuggling.64
Following the district court’s denial of the respondent’s motion to
suppress the marijuana, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed after concluding that several factors relied upon by the agent
to justify stopping respondent were impermissible.65  In particular,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a majority of the factors were not sug-
gestive of criminal activity and therefore carried little or no weight in
the reasonable suspicion calculus.66  Although the Supreme Court
agreed that several factors were “susceptible to innocent explana-
tion,”67 it nevertheless reversed by deferring to the agent’s observa-
tions, his registration check of respondent’s vehicle, and his
experience as a border patrol agent.68
Taken together, it seems fair to conclude that the Court in Brigoni-
Ponce made constitutional an “illegal immigrant profile” and then ex-
pressed a willingness to defer to a border patrol agent’s use of that
profile in Arvizu.  That conclusion is surely bolstered by the Court’s
past willingness to condone profiling generally69 and its correspond-
63. Id. at 272.
64. Id. at 269–72.
65. Id. at 272.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 277.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (“A court sitting to deter-
mine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate
the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set
forth in a ‘profile’ does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as
seen by a trained agent.”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983) (stating that
defendant’s flight into Palm Beach, overnight stay in a motel, and apparent im-
mediate return to Chicago, with the family car awaiting him, was “as suggestive
of a pre-arranged drug run, as it [was] of an ordinary vacation trip”); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548 n.1 (1980) (noting that the suspect’s be-
havior fit “the so-called ‘drug-courier profile’—an informally compiled abstract of
characteristics though typical of persons carrying illicit drugs”).
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ing willingness to show deference to reasonable suspicion decisions
made by officers in the field.70
III. IMMIGRATION LAW AND CAR STOPS
This Part explores the possible immigration consequences of a
fruitful stop—i.e., a stop in which an officer discovers an individual’s
undocumented status.  To do so, this Part offers, in section III.A, a
brief primer on immigration law and thereafter, in section III.B, con-
siders whether there is anything illegal—i.e., criminally punishable—
about being a so-called illegal immigrant.  Section III.C concludes by
explaining the relationship between federal immigration agents and
local law enforcement.
A. Immigration Law:  The Basics
Immigration law is based on a complex and interwoven set of stat-
utes found in the Immigration and Nationality Act and Title 8 of the
United States Code.71  Speaking broadly, these statutes codify (1) the
means of obtaining immigration status in the United States, (2) the
reasons why an alien can either be ineligible for entry into the United
States—often termed “inadmissible”72—or deportable from the United
States,73 and (3) the process by which removal is accomplished.74  Al-
though the majority of the immigration code describes civil proceed-
ings and penalties, it also includes criminal provisions for certain
immigration violations.
The immigration code categorizes immigrants according to varied
“types of status,” and two main categories of aliens present in the
United States are most relevant to this Article:  documented immi-
70. E.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[T]he evidence thus col-
lected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but
as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”).
71. Immigration laws are codified in Title 8 of the United States Code with parallel
citations in the Immigration and Nationality Act.  This Article will cite to the
United States Code sections throughout.
72. Aliens are inadmissible if they fit within the categories provided in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (2006).  Section 1182 contains ten main categories of inadmissibility, in-
cluding health-related grounds, criminal grounds, and immigration offense re-
lated grounds. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
73. Deportability grounds appear in 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (Supp. 2008).  There are seven
main categories within this section, many similar to those listed in § 1182.
74. Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996, immigration laws referred to “deporting” an alien.  Pub. L. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.  The current version of the INA calls aliens who are
ineligible for admission “inadmissible.”  It also terms those who have been admit-
ted but are no longer eligible to stay “deportable.”  Finally, any alien who is either
inadmissible or deportable is, by consequence, “removable.”
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grants and undocumented immigrants.75  Documented immigrants
are generally either temporary nonimmigrants present for a specific
purpose—e.g., an ambassador, student, or tourist76—or lawful perma-
nent residents (LPRs).77  LPRs are present in the United States on a
more permanent basis, and they have the ability to naturalize after a
period of stay ranging between three and five years.78  Both nonimmi-
grants and LPRs are inspected at the border.79  During inspection,
border agents must assess whether the alien is inadmissible pursuant
to certain categories of inadmissibility.80  Importantly, there are also
two types of undocumented aliens:  those who were initially inspected
and admitted but overstayed their legal stay81 and those who were
never legally admitted.
Regardless of their status, all aliens in the United States are sub-
ject to inadmissibility and deportability standards at some point dur-
ing their time in the United States.82  The standards for
inadmissibility and deportability are generally similar and exclude in-
75. Other types of status exist.  For example, the alien may possess “temporary pro-
tected status,” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2006), be eligible for relief pursuant to section
203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA),
Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196-2200 (1997) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), obtain asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006), or acquire
withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006).  A small group of individu-
als might enter the United States without a visa pursuant to the Visa Waiver
Program, which enables individuals from countries with low immigration rates
and high temporary travel rates to visit the United States for fewer than ninety
days for tourism or business. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2006); Bureau of Consular
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Visa Waiver Program (VWP), TRAVEL.STATE.GOV.,
http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/without_1990.html (last visited May 9,
2011).
76. The United States Code lists twenty-two temporary visas, alongside so-called “de-
rivatives” for the spouse and children of primary visa holders.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15) (Supp. 2010).
77. Lawful permanent residents are colloquially known as “green card” holders,
though the card they receive is no longer green and looks more like a driver’s
license. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://
www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data/dslpr.shtm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
78. Naturalization requires a specific period of residence in the United States, good
moral character, comprehension of the English language, adherence to the princi-
ples of the Constitution, and knowledge of American history.  8 U.S.C §§ 1423,
1427 (2006).
79. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(7)(A), 1181(b) (Supp. 2010) (discussing docu-
ments for readmission of returning resident immigrants and nonimmigrants).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. 2010).
81. For instance, students are usually admitted to the United States for “duration of
status,” meaning they are eligible to stay in the United States so long as they
maintain their status as a student.  They must leave the United States upon
graduation.  Individuals who overstay their student visa are deportable.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1) (Supp. 2008).
82. An Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent can issue a Notice to Appear,
thereby placing the alien in removal proceedings, if the agent suspects that the
alien is either inadmissible or deportable.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).
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dividuals on the basis of health-related, criminal, security, public
charge, and immigration violation grounds, though the statutes do
treat the relevance of prior criminal conduct differently.83  Taking
each concept in turn, the inadmissible alien is one who is not eligible
to enter the United States.  Stated more specifically, any alien who
enters the United States through the inspection and admission pro-
cess is subject to inadmissibility standards; if the alien is deemed
inadmissible pursuant to those standards, she will not be admitted
into the country.84
Once an alien is admitted into the country, deportation standards
replace those governing admissibility.  Regardless of whether the
alien is temporary or permanent, she must abide by those standards
during the totality of her stay in the United States.85  Thus, for exam-
ple, the alien who commits certain crimes while in the United States
immediately becomes deportable and subject to removal from the
country.86  Aliens who overstay their lawful period of admission be-
come “undocumented” and are likewise subject to deportation.87  Of
course, because aliens not legally admitted to the country have not
properly entered the country and are by definition “undocumented,”
they remain continuously subject to inadmissibility standards.88  In
sum, documented aliens and undocumented aliens previously admit-
ted are subject to removal if they fall under any categories listed in the
83. For instance, § 1227(a)(2)(B), the deportability statutes, and §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)
(i)(II) and 1182(a)(2)(C), the inadmissibility statute, address aliens who were pre-
viously convicted for any offense related to a controlled substance.  The de-
portability statute, however, exempts simple possession of thirty or fewer grams
of marijuana, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and it includes waivers not present in the inad-
missibility statute—e.g. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (possession of marijuana of thirty or
fewer grams) and §1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (waiver for certain criminal offenses where
alien, subsequent to conviction, has been granted full and unconditional pardon
by the President or a governor).  This interplay between the two statutes is per-
vasive, though the admissibility statute is thematically broader in its coverage.
That statute, for example, includes more categories than does the deportability
statute and omits exceptions to various criminal grounds present in the de-
portability statute. Compare § 1182(a)(2), with § 1227(a)(2).  Moreover, some
criminal grounds of inadmissibility do not require an actual conviction, whereas
all criminal deportability grounds do. Compare § 1182(a)(2)(C)–(I), with
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)–(H).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (Supp. 2009).  Although nonimmigrants are subject to ad-
missibility standards each time they enter the United States, LPRs generally
need only satisfy those requirements at their first entry.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(C) (Supp. 2010).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (Supp. 2008) (providing the standards governing deportation).
86. Id. § 1227(a)(2) (listing, for example, qualifying crimes involving moral turpitude,
aggravated felonies, and controlled substance violations).
87. Id. § 1227(a)(1).
88. One of the grounds of inadmissibility is presence without admission, making all
unlawful entry aliens subject to removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (Supp.
2010).
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deportation statute; undocumented aliens not previously admitted are
subject to removal if they fall under a category listed by the inadmissi-
bility statute.
To briefly illustrate how these statutes work in practice, assume a
hypothetical alien is suspected of being either inadmissible or deport-
able (and therefore removable).  When our hypothetically removable
alien comes to the attention of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE),89 ICE will issue to the alien a Notice to Appear in Immigration
Court.  The Notice lists factual allegations related to entry and activ-
ity in the United States, as well as any corresponding charges of re-
movability.90  The alien thereafter enters civil removal proceedings
within the jurisdiction of the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
a civil court system within the Department of Justice.91  Once in the
immigration court, an immigration judge, assistant chief counsel, and
the alien—referred to as the respondent—participate in a bench trial
to determine if the alien is inadmissible or deportable.92  If the judge
determines, or the alien admits, removability, the proceeding moves to
89. ICE is one of three components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
created through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 446, 116
Stat. 2135, 2195 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).  All components of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service were transferred to DHS and di-
vided into ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Citizenship and Im-
migration Services (CIS).  6 U.S.C. § 291 (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1551 (2006).  A
reorganization plan pursuant to the Homeland Security Act changed the Bureau
of Border Security to ICE and the Customs Service to the CBP.  6 U.S.C. § 542
(2006).  These three agencies perform specific duties related to immigration.  8
U.S.C. § 1551 (2006).  CBP is responsible for the admission of aliens and border
initiatives.  6 U.S.C. § 2152 (2006).  CIS is responsible for applications for immi-
gration status.  6 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).  ICE is responsible for apprehending and
removing aliens within the United States.  6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 255 (2006).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2006).
91. Although immigration law is a subset of administrative law, the immigration
court system is not governed by typical administrative law court rules. See Jill E.
Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 595, 598, 611–27 (2009) (describing the more limited judicial review in
immigration adjudication as compared to administrative adjudication).  Notably,
however, scholars are currently advocating for reform to the system. See, e.g.,
Michelel Benedetto, Crisis On The Immigration Bench:  An Ethical Perspective,
73 BROOK.  L. REV. 467, 485–88 (2008) (advocating judicial ethics reform for im-
migration adjudication); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adju-
dication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1553–60 (2010) (analyzing
possible judicial specialization in immigration adjudication); Stephen H. Legom-
sky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1636 (2010).
92. The alien is entitled to an attorney, but not at the government’s expense.  8
U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(E) (2006).  In cases charging inadmissibility, the burden is on
the alien to prove that they are admissible. Id. § 1229a(c)(2).  For cases alleging
deportability, the government must prove that the alien has lost her status. Id.
§ 1229a(c)(3).  The assistant chief counsel, from the ICE Litigation Unit, repre-
sents the government at the hearing.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.2 (2010).
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evaluating whether the alien is eligible for relief from removability.93
Should the alien not be entitled to relief, the judge enters an order of
removal directing the alien to return to her home country.94  If she is
eligible for a form of relief, the result is often a grant of lawful perma-
nent residence.95  Should our hypothetical alien be ineligible for relief,
she may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and thereafter, if
necessary, to the appropriate United States circuit court.96
B. What Is Illegal about Being an Illegal?
What could officers on roving patrol near the border be hunting
for?  Stated more pointedly, what makes an illegal, illegal?  The ques-
tion is an important one given that the immigration code distin-
guishes criminal from civil violations.97  The criminal violations range
from misdemeanors to felonies, whereas the civil violations are pun-
ished through fines and the prospect of removal proceedings in immi-
gration court.98  Multiple sections address more serious immigration-
related criminal activity, such as aiding the unlawful entry of a felon
or trafficking for “immoral purposes.”99  More relevant to this Article,
however, are two criminal provisions that may apply to undocumented
aliens with no other criminal or immigration related past—sections
1302 and 1325.100
The first of these two criminal provisions penalizes an unlawful
entry into the United States as a misdemeanor punishable by up to six
months imprisonment and/or a fine.101  Accordingly, any alien who
93. As with immigration “status,” there are multiple forms of relief from removal.
Cancellation of removal and asylum are just two examples of relief.  For a better
understanding of the types of relief and the requirements for it, see EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: FORMS OF RELIEF
FROM REMOVAL (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/Relief
FromRemoval.pdf.
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2006).
95. See id. § 1229b.
96. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.15, 1252(b)(2) (2010).
97. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2006) (describing both civil and criminal penalties for
document fraud), with id. § 1324d (providing civil penalties for failure to depart
pursuant to a final order of removal).
98. For example, the Code punishes, as a first offense, eluding inspection at a port of
entry with a fine and/or up to six months in prison.  8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (2006).
For the second offense of eluding inspection, an alien will be subject to a fine and
up to two years imprisonment. Id.  The Code also provides for civil penalties for
eluding:  $50–250 for the first offense and $100–500 for the second offense. Id.
§ 1325(b).  Commission of eluding triggers removal proceedings. Id.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
99. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323, 1324, 1326, 1327, 1328 (2006).  An immoral purpose is
generally defined as importation of individuals for prostitution. See United
States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 1991).
100. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1305 (2006).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
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enters at an undesignated time or place, by eluding inspection or
through fraudulent means, may be criminally punished.102  By way of
limitation, however, the criminal penalties associated with unlawful
entry apply only to undocumented aliens who enter the country with-
out permission (but not to those undocumented aliens who overstay a
visa).103
Undocumented aliens might also violate registration requirements
by failing to register upon entering the United States.104  Indeed, the
Code requires any alien present in the United States for longer than
thirty days to apply for registration and be fingerprinted.105  Follow-
ing registration, aliens must notify the Attorney General of an address
change within ten days of such change.106  Importantly, an alien’s
willful failure to register is punishable as a misdemeanor, and a will-
ful failure to provide notification of an address change is punishable
as a misdemeanor and the initiation of removal proceedings.107
At this point, it is worth recalling that there exists more than one
type of “undocumented alien” in the United States—those who enter
the country unlawfully and those who overstay their visas are both
“undocumented.”108  Aliens who have overstayed their visas initially
registered to obtain the visa and are therefore exempt from the regis-
tration requirements governing those who enter the country unlaw-
102. Id.  The Supreme Court has specifically declined to determine whether unlawful
entry in violation of § 1302(a) constitutes a continuing offense, reasoning even a
single violation suffices as a basis for removal regardless of whether it is continu-
ing in nature. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.3 (1984).
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006) (criminally punishing only entering or attempting to
enter).
104. Id. § 1302.  Requiring an alien who has not registered pursuant to a visa applica-
tion but has been present in the United States for longer than thirty days to
apply for registration would seem simple enough.  Yet, the Department of Justice
does not clarify how an undocumented alien can comply with the requirement,
despite clear Code language requiring the Attorney General to create registration
forms and procedures.  8 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).  The absence of an established
procedure for compliance suggests that it is, in fact, impossible for an alien to
actually register properly (though it may also suggest that it would likewise be
impossible for an alien to willfully fail to register).
105. Id. § 1302(a) (requiring aliens who are fourteen or older to register); see id.
§ 1302(b) (requiring the parents or legal guardians of aliens under the age of
fourteen to register them and transfer the duty to register and be fingerprinted to
the alien upon attaining fourteen years of age).
106. Id. § 1305(a).
107. Id. § 1306.
108. Statistics compiled and provided by the government fail to clarify what percent-
age of the current undocumented population falls under either of these catego-
ries.  Although the percentage of undocumented aliens who overstay their legal
entry—as opposed to those who entered unlawfully—is difficult to discern, some
estimates suggest that 25% to 40% of the population are visa overstays. PEW
HISPANIC CTR., MODES OF ENTRY FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION
2–3 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf.
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fully.109  That same exemption extends to any undocumented alien
who previously applied for any immigration benefit, like temporary
protected status or asylum.110  Accordingly, this particular registra-
tion requirement applies only to those undocumented aliens who have
never before applied for an immigration benefit.111
C. Local Law Enforcement and Immigration
As noted above, there are two separate consequences to being un-
documented:  civil penalties in the form of removal from the country if
they are removable and criminal penalties if the alien has violated
certain sections of the Code.  Still, who is charged with identifying
which immigrants are subject to these penalties?  Customs and Bor-
der Protection agents by far apprehend the highest numbers of un-
documented aliens at or near the border.112  Yet, ICE also has a
significant apprehension role by using internal initiatives to appre-
hend aliens within the United States, like workplace raids.113  More
relevant to this Article, however, is the relationship ICE has with local
law enforcement, which enables local authorities to help enforce both
the civil and criminal aspects of immigration law.114
Although federal law permits federal and state collaboration on im-
migration law enforcement,115 local and state policy or legislation ulti-
mately determines the actual involvement of local law enforcement.
Some local policies may, for example, require local authorities to work
109. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(b), 1301, 1302 (2006).
110. Id.
111. Cf. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 n.3 (1984) (noting that the failure
to properly register as an alien upon entering the United States is a crime).
112. Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Securing America’s Borders: CBP
Fiscal Year 2009 in Review Fact Sheet (Nov. 24, 2009), available at http://www.
cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2009_news_releases/nov_09/1
1242009_5.xml.  Aliens apprehended at the border generally go through an expe-
dited removal process in lieu of the removal process described above. See 8
U.S.C. § 1225 (2006).
113. In 2008, ICE removed over 350,000 “illegal” aliens from the United States.  U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT iii
(2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/
2008annual-report.pdf.  Perhaps one of the most infamous recent raids took place
in Postville, Iowa, in May 2008, during which 389 immigrants were arrested at a
meat-processing plant—the largest employer in northeast Iowa.  Spencer S. Hsu,
Immigration Raid Jars a Small Town, WASH. POST, May 18, 2008, at A1, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/17/AR2008
051702474.html.
114. LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRA-
TION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2009), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf (reviewing the recent
trends in relationships between local law enforcement and federal agencies).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (referred to as section 287(g) programs).
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directly with ICE.116  Alternatively, other local policies could create a
so-called “sanctuary city” by prohibiting local contact with federal
agencies about immigration enforcement.117  When analyzing the pro-
priety of a state policy, 18 U.S.C. § 1373(a) unavoidably takes center-
stage because it prevents local and state authorities from prohibiting
or restricting communication with ICE about the immigration status
of any individual.118  Although the statute does not require communi-
cation between localities and ICE, it no doubt influences how local
governments set policy.119
116. Although a more in-depth discussion follows, the main tool for involving local law
enforcement is section 287(g) programs.  These programs create an explicit con-
nection between local law enforcement and DHS through a Memorandum of
Agreement. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
117. Traditionally, sanctuary cities essentially adopt “don’t ask, don’t tell” policies.
Alex Koppelman, Congress to New York (and Chicago and L.A.): Drop Dead,
SALON (Oct. 4, 2007, 7:45 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/10/04/
sanctuary/index.html.  Although the 1980s saw a large influx of such cities, the
rising concerns with aliens committing serious criminal offenses and infiltrating
certain areas have left few true sanctuary cities remaining. See SEGHETTI, supra
note 114, at 18–19 (noting the increasingly “contentious” nature of sanctuary cit-
ies and the contrasting jurisdictional actions regarding sanctuary policies); Jen-
nifer M. Hansen, Comment, Sanctuary’s Demise: The Unintended Effects of State
and Local Law Enforcement, 10 SCHOLAR 289, 306–08 (2008) (discussing the in-
creasing popularity of sanctuary cities, but noting the federal and state laws de-
signed to curtail their effectiveness); Laura Sullivan, Note, Enforcing
Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion
of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information Center Database, 97
CAL. L. REV. 567, 573–78 (2009) (same).
The City of San Francisco nicely illustrates this evolution.  Once a “don’t ask,
don’t tell” city, highly publicized violent offenses by undocumented youth caused
San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom to require local authorities to begin report-
ing youths arrested on suspicion of felonies to ICE.  Jessie McKinley, San Fran-
cisco at Crossroads Over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at A12.  The
Board of Supervisors later amended the Mayor’s order to require reporting only
those actually convicted of felonies.  Rachel Gordon, Standoff Over Sanctuary
Law, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/cityinsider/
detail?entry_id=58481.  The City is currently divided over whether to follow Cali-
fornia’s agreement with the federal Secure Communities program, which would
require the city’s local law enforcement to submit the fingerprints of any person
booked through their criminal system.  Rachel Gordon, Tug-of-War Over IDing
Illegals, S.F. CHRON., May 26, 2010, at C1.
118. Section 1373(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or
in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2006).
119. For example, the Texas Attorney General has opined that local policies prevent-
ing communication with federal agencies are likely a “nullity” and that “[t]he
Texas Legislature is not prohibited from adopting some form of legislation de-
signed to compel local governments to comply with any duties they have under
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Of course, § 1373 more than suggests the impropriety of sanctuary
cities.  A true sanctuary city is one in which local officials have deter-
mined that no government employee will report undocumented aliens
to federal immigration officials.120  Pursuant to such a policy, mem-
bers of law enforcement are not permitted to ask suspects questions
about their immigration status during an arrest, a conviction, or even
during the detention phase following their conviction.121  Not surpris-
ingly, few true sanctuary cities remain.  Rather, a range of local poli-
cies now exist; on the one end, a locality might employ a “don’t ask,
don’t tell” program, whereas, on the other, a locality might fully dis-
close all collected immigration information to DHS.  Most cities exist
between these two extremes, creating policies to address both the level
of participation with ICE122 as well as the stage during which individ-
uals are reported to ICE.123
To be considered alongside local policies are certain federal pro-
grams that exist to promote joint state and federal cooperation.  In
2007, for example, ICE created the Criminal Alien Program, now ac-
tive in all 114 federal and state prisons and over 300 local jails, which
is designed to help identify removable aliens by allowing federal ac-
federal immigration laws, so long as such legislation is not inconsistent with fed-
eral law.”  Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0699 (2009).  Several communities in
Texas have since joined the Secure Communities federal program that, in short,
allows for communication about detained individuals to DHS.  Julian Aguilar,
More Detainers Placed on Immigrants, TEX. TRIB., June 21, 2010, http://www.
texastribune.org/immigration-in-texas/immigration/more-detainers-placed-on-
immigrants/.  Even Dallas, historically a sanctuary city, now participates in the
Secure Communities program.  Dianne Solis, Dallas County is Part of Secure
Communities Program that Raises Immigrant Profiling Concerns, DALL. MORN-
ING NEWS, July 31, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/
city/dallas/stories/072510dnmetsecure.38cbe0d.html.
120. See SEGHETTI, supra note 114, at 26.
121. For example, Haines Borough, Alaska, prohibits the Borough, its officers, em-
ployees, and agents from enforcing immigration matters. HAINES BOROUGH,
ALASKA, RESOLUTION 5-12-078 (2005), available at http://www.hainesborough.us/
Resolutions/R511278.pdf.  The National Immigration Law Center provides a list
of all “sanctuary cities” in the country along with a comprehensive list of the
types of laws in place. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND
POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION
LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 1 (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/
immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/locallaw-limiting-tbl-2008-12-03.pdf.
122. For instance, some cities contact ICE only when a felony is involved, but do not
check the immigration status of misdemeanants. CICERO, ILL., POLICE DEPART-
MENT GENERAL ORDER 61-01-02 (1998), available at http://www.democracyinac
tion.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/CiceroPoliceDept.pdf; see NAT’L IM-
MIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 121, at 6.
123. In promulgating a local policy to govern relations with the federal government,
various cities make decisions on whether to cooperate based on when cooperation
would be required—i.e., at the arrest stage, the charging stage, and the convic-
tion stage. See supra notes 120 and 122 and accompanying text.
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cess to local databases of incarcerated individuals.124  Consider also
the “Secure Communities” program, which began in 2008 after a con-
gressional appropriation to ICE.125  In brief, the program allows local
law enforcement to transmit data to ICE about individuals it deter-
mines are foreign nationals.126  Although the nominal purpose of the
program is to focus on serious criminal offenders, the program’s scope
includes a range of criminal offenses and delegates to local ICE offices
the discretion to set enforcement priorities.127
More informally, localities might also simply contact federal au-
thorities following the arrest and booking of an individual in a local
jail.  If, for instance, a member of local law enforcement alerts federal
authorities after stopping an undocumented alien who is suspected of
a criminal offense, like unlawful entry or failure to depart after an
order of removal, that alien can be placed in federal criminal proceed-
ings.128  Importantly, civil proceedings may also commence immedi-
ately, wholly apart from any criminal consequences, if federal
authorities suspect the alien should be removed.129
Yet, most relevant to this Article is the extensive partnership be-
tween federal, state, and local law enforcement, known colloquially as
“287(g) programs.”130  In short, 287(g) programs allow for the federal
124. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FACT SHEET: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2008) (on file with author); ANDREA
GUTTIN, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., SPECIAL REPORT: THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PRO-
GRAM:  IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 6 (2010), available
at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Criminal_
Alien_Program_021710.pdf.
125. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FACT SHEET: SECURE COMMUNITIES 1 (2009) (on file with author).
126. Id.
127. Id. Some 1265 local jurisdictions in forty-two states have already signed up for
the Secure Communities program.  U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS (2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf.  Nationwide
access to the program will be available by 2013. Id.
128. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).  Such a consequence is permissible given that federal
courts have uniformly held that many of the constitutional protections afforded to
those in criminal proceedings are not required in civil immigration proceedings.
See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 529–31 (1954) (finding the ex post facto clause does not apply in
deportation proceedings); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977)
(finding that Miranda rights are not applicable in deportation proceedings). But
see Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an egre-
gious violation of Fourth Amendment rights can result in the exclusion of
evidence).
130. Section 287(g) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[The Attorney General may] enter into a written agreement with a
State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer
or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attor-
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deputization of local law enforcement.131  The program permits local
officers—pursuant to a written agreement with DHS—to carry out
federal immigration functions like investigation, apprehension, and/or
detention.132  Although the deputized officers remain employed by the
locality,133 they operate under “the direction and supervision of the
Attorney General.”134  As such, they are considered federal employees
for purposes of determining individual or governmental liability and
for determining their compensation following a work-related in-
jury.135  The programs also allow for unfettered federal access to local
information; indeed, there is no requirement that an alien be in a spe-
cific stage of criminal proceeding (e.g., arrest, charge, or conviction)
before the individual’s information is made available to federal au-
thorities.136  Thus, although there are multiple ways in which local
law enforcement agencies are connected to federal officials at ICE, the
most extensive relationship exists through 287(g) programs.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMMIGRANT PROFILING
Synthesizing just a few of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the
context of that brief immigration discussion demonstrates how much
discretion even local officers possess in ordinary street and car stop
encounters.  As one of our former criminal procedure professors was
fond of saying, “in no other job does discretion increase the lower down
on the hierarchical chain you go.”  Indeed, through its decisions in
Terry, White, and Whren, the Court has provided local officers with
nearly unfettered discretion.  Moreover, when Brigoni-Ponce, Arvizu,
and 287(g) programs are considered alongside Terry, White, and
Whren, it becomes clear that no meaningful checks exist on the au-
thority of deputized law enforcement at the border or its functional
ney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration of-
ficer in relation to the investigation, apprehension or detention of aliens
in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across
State line s to detention centers), may carry out such function at the
expense of the State or political subdivision and to extent consistent with
State and local law.
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006).  For a link to each Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) between ICE and a locality, see U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY
SECTION 287(g), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2011).
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1357(g)(7).
134. Id. § 1357(g)(3).
135. Id. § 1357(g)(8), (g)(7).
136. See id. § 1357(g)(2) (providing for federal access to local information without re-
quiring an alien to be in a particular stage of a criminal case).
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equivalent.137  Profiling, ethnic targeting, and outright racism sup-
ported by “reasonable suspicion” all seem constitutionally permissible
at or near the border.138  Remember, there are no constitutional pro-
tections awaiting the alien in immigration proceedings.139
From the standpoint of the Fourth Amendment, it also seems fairly
clear at this point that the Arizona Act is constitutional.140  After all,
137. To be clear, border patrol agents have no authority to stop a car on the basis of a
suspected traffic violation. See id. § 1357 (empowering immigration officers to
interrogate aliens or suspected aliens as to his right to be in the U.S.; to make
certain arrests of aliens violating immigration laws, usually in the officer’s pres-
ence or view; to board vessels in territorial water; to conduct warrantless
searches of persons seeking admission when reasonable cause exists to suspect
the person is not admissible; and to take custody of aliens arrested for violation of
drug laws). White and Whren are nonetheless applicable because, as noted, the
creation of 287(g) programs allow for federal deputization of local law
enforcement.
138. That same reasonable suspicion may of course extend even to traffic offenses. See
supra note 57 and accompanying citations.  Despite the stated objective of 287(g)
to target violent or serious criminals, many jurisdictions have seen a rise in traf-
fic violations and subsequent removal proceedings. See Sarah Ovaska, Data:
Most Deportees Are Minor Offenders, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 25, 2010, http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/03/25/1335099/data-most-deportees-are-minor.
html.  Some therefore claim that 287(g) programs impose too much of a burden on
local police and shift their focus from localized law enforcement to federal immi-
gration enforcement. See HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST,
BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE,
2002–2004, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI_
report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf.
139. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“Consistent with the civil
nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context do not
apply in a deportation hearing.”).  Addressing the inapplicability of, for example,
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, the Supreme Court has relied
heavily on to the specific training and specialization of immigration officers. Id.
at 1044–46.  Yet, as the lines between criminal enforcement and immigration en-
forcement at the local level are blurred, “[n]onfederal actors who are using immi-
gration enforcement powers to achieve their criminal law objectives are able to
circumvent some of the constitutional baselines that apply to criminal policing
without confronting the sanctions that would be available in the criminal sys-
tem.”  Jennifer M. Cha´con, A Diversion of Attention: Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1570
(2010).
140. As foretold by Judge Bolton’s recent opinion, the Arizona law may unconstitu-
tionally violate the Supremacy Clause. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
At present, there is a split among federal circuit courts as to whether the federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act preempts all state and local regulation of
immigration. Compare Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976
(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Arizona’s Legal Arizona Workers Act is facially
constitutional), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 558 F.3d 856
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom., Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130
S. Ct. 3498 (2009), with Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517–29
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that state-based immigration ordinances are expressly
and impliedly preempted).
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Arizona simply codified what the Supreme Court’s holdings permit.
Indeed, the Arizona Act is the product of its surrounding jurispruden-
tial environment—an environment that over time has come to implic-
itly condone law enforcement conduct that, according to recent press,
has finally crossed the threshold into conduct society is not prepared
to accept as reasonable.
Apart from the public outcry surrounding the Arizona Act, apply-
ing the reasonable suspicion standard to assessing a citizen’s immi-
gration status seems to further eviscerate the Court’s core holding in
Terry.  Given that the reasonable suspicion standard now applies to
other non-criminal conduct, like traffic offenses,141 it is easy to forget
that Terry limited its reasonable suspicion standard to an officer’s be-
lief that “criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.”142  Yet,
there is nothing necessarily criminal about an individual’s status as
“undocumented.”143  Further, unlike an officer’s belief that a person
committed a traffic offense, there’s something far more normatively
uncomfortable about allowing officers to generate the requisite rea-
sonable suspicion to believe an individual is undocumented by relying
in whole or in part on that individual’s Mexican ethnicity.  That same
discomfort, albeit in the context of race, generated an overflow of
scholarship skewering the Court for its decision in Whren.144
Moreover, even if the holding in Whren in particular is somehow
faithful to Terry’s requirement that officers believe criminal activity is
141. See, e.g., Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“The Fourth Amendment requires that an officer making [a temporary detention
during a traffic stop] have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped has committed a traffic violation or is otherwise engaged in or about to be
engaged in criminal activity.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v.
Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment re-
quires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.” (in-
ternal citations and quotations omitted)); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71
F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer
had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.” (in-
ternal citation and quotation marks omitted)); supra note 57 and accompanying
citations.
142. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (emphasis added).
143. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis of
Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597,
597 (1999); Mark M. Dobson, The Police, Pretextual Investigatory Activity, and
the Fourth Amendment: What Hath Whren Wrought?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 707,
763 (1997); Diana Roberto Donahoe, “Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the Su-
preme Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United States, 34 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1193, 1194 (1997); David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s
Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 585 (1998); Illya Lichtenberg,
Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 425, 451 (2003).
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afoot, lower court decisions interpreting the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence suggest that the pendulum favoring police discretion has swung
too far in the border context.  Should, for example, border patrol
agents stop a blue van traveling at a normal rate of speed at 9:30 PM
about fifteen miles from the Del Rio border area on a road that lacks a
checkpoint?  Yes, says the Fifth Circuit.145  In United States v.
Zapata-Ibarra,146 a veteran border patrol agent of ten years—armed
with only the preceding facts—made a U-turn after passing the blue
van and ultimately elected to stop the van after (1) it slowed down, (2)
the officer saw several passengers, (3) the passengers appeared to
slouch down, and (4) the van was driving on an indirect route based on
its place of registration.147  Relying on the Brigoni-Ponce factors, the
court upheld the stop as constitutional by reasoning that the van was
close to the Mexican border, the road was a known smuggling route,
the agent was experienced, the van slowed down after witnessing the
agent make a U-turn, and the van had several passengers.148
The court’s holding in Zapata-Ibarra is neither unique nor surpris-
ing.149  As detailed above, the Supreme Court has showered border
agents with discretionary power, and it should therefore surprise no
one that wholly innocent behavior may provide agents with “reasona-
ble suspicion.”
Another noteworthy but perhaps equally unsurprising result is the
cost exacted from broader society by arming border patrol agents with
inordinate discretion.  In July of 2008, five individuals and Somos
145. In truth, the driver’s proximity to the border in this hypothetical likely ends the
inquiry.  Border patrol agents may stop and interrogate “any alien or person be-
lieved to be an alien” who is “within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1357(1), (3) (2006).  Federal regula-
tions interpret the term “reasonable distance” to mean a distance “within 100 air
miles from any external boundary of the United States.”  As one district court
noted, “Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357 seems to give officers of the INS, including Border
Patrol agents, complete discretion to stop vehicles without a warrant or probable
cause within a reasonable distance of the border.”  United States v. Rubio-Her-
nandez, 39 F. Supp. 808, 831 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
146. 212 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 2000).
147. Id. at 879–80.
148. Id. at 881–84.
149. See, e.g., United State v. Magana, 797 F.2d 777, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gonzalez,
No. 05-250, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36728, at *23–31 (D.P.R. Nov. 1, 2005). But
see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The
likelihood that in an area in which the majority—or even a substantial part—of
the population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an
alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a
relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”); Rubio-Hernandez, 39 F.
Supp. at 834–37 (finding no reasonable suspicion to support a stop despite the
facts that the driver was Hispanic, he did not acknowledge agents as he passed
them, swerved and looked into the rearview mirror nervously, and drove on a
common route for smugglers).
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America, a Latino community-based coalition, sued Maricopa County,
Arizona, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio,
charging that they or their members were unlawfully stopped and
mistreated by law enforcement because they were Latino.150  The
class action suit alleged, inter alia, that Arpaio and the County (1)
engaged in generalized “crime suppression sweeps” in Latino neigh-
borhoods of day laborers; (2) made a public statement that physical
appearance alone is sufficient to question an individual about their
immigration status; and (3) used volunteers to assist in these crime
sweeps who have known animosity towards Hispanics and immi-
grants.151  Although defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the mo-
tion via memorandum opinion in February 2009.152  Although the liti-
gation remains ongoing, it is perhaps worth noting that the
defendants were recently sanctioned for destroying evidence.153
More attenuated consequences of the Supreme Court’s discretion-
granting jurisprudence have also surfaced outside Arizona.  In New
York, for example, Nassau County enacted what critics have dubbed
the “waving while Latino” law, which was enacted to curb soliciting
immigrant day laborers.154  In Texas, the Northern District recently
struck down legislation enacted by the City of Farmers Branch which
conditions residence in rental housing within the City on lawful pres-
ence in the United States.155  Finally, in Pennsylvania, a federal judge
in 2007 struck down an ordinance in Hazelton designed to bar undocu-
mented immigrants from working or renting homes there.156  Of
course, back in Arizona, constitutional challenges to SB 1070 have al-
ready surfaced.157
The next question is an obvious one—what now?  First, consistent
with Terry, roving border patrol stops should be made on the basis of
150. First Amended Complaint at 2–3, Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D.
Ariz. 2009) (No. CV 07-02513-PHX-MHM).
151. Id. at 11–16.
152. Melendres, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
153. Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20311,
at *24 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2010).
154. Robin Finn, Town Divides Over Law Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2009, at MB1.
155. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835
(2010).
156. Julia Preston, Judge Voids Ordinance on Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/us/27hazelton.html.
157. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and other Relief, Nat’l Coal. of Latino
Clergy and Christian Leaders v. Arizona, No. CV-10-0943-PHX (D. Ariz. Apr. 29,
2010), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/
ClergyComplaint-4-29-10.pdf; Complaint, Escobar v. Brewer, No. CV-10-00249
(D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/
default/files/docs/lac/EscobarComplaint-4-29-10.pdf.
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reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver or the vehicle’s occu-
pants are engaged in criminal activity.  A mere belief or unparticu-
larized hunch that the driver or her occupants are undocumented is
insufficient.
Second, as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus at the border,
the factors provided by the Court in Brigoni-Ponce require revision.
In 2010, can it be that “[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexi-
can ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a
relevant factor” in the reasonable suspicion calculation?158  It is true
that some 86.1% of those apprehended at the border between 2005 and
2008 for being undocumented in the United States were Mexican na-
tionals.159  That statistic undoubtedly suggests that nationality is a
significant factor at the border.  The constitutional problem, however,
arises away from the border:  although it is a crime to enter the coun-
try undocumented,160 it is not necessarily criminally punishable to
otherwise simply be in the country undocumented.161  Given that
Mexicans—and immigrants generally—are no more prone than any
other ethnicity or race to committing crimes,162 the color of one’s skin
158. United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975).
159. NANCY RYTINA & JOHN SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET, APPRE-
HENSION BY THE U.S. BORDER PATROL: 2005–2008 (2009), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_apprehensions_fs_2005-2008.
pdf.
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
161. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying citations.
162. Immigrants and immigrant communities maintain low crime rates despite often
being faced with adverse social conditions more conducive to criminal behavior,
such as low income and low education levels. See Ramiro Martinez, Jr. & Mat-
thew T. Lee, On Immigration and Crime, in 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000: THE NA-
TURE OF CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 485, 501 (2000), available at http://
www.ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf (“In the small number of stud-
ies providing empirical evidence, immigrants are generally less involved in crime
than similarly situated groups, despite the wealth of prominent criminological
theories that provide good reasons why this should not be the case . . . .”); Dennis
Wagner, Violence is Not Up on Arizona Border Despite Mexican Drug War, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, May 2, 2010, at A1; Kristine F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Why
Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence of Selective Immigration,
Deterrence, and Deportation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13229, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13229 (“18-40 year-old
male immigrants have lower institutionalized rates than are one-fifth of the na-
tive born.”).
When it comes to Mexicans specifically, incarceration rates among young men
are the lowest compared to other immigrant groups. RUBE´N G. RUMBAUT & WAL-
TER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR, THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY
AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILIATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND
FOREIGN-BORN MEN 1 (2007), available at http://www.americanimmigration
council.org/sites/default/files/docs/Imm%20Criminality%20%28IPC%29.pdf.  In
2003, foreign-born Mexicans had an incarceration rate of only 0.7% compared to
the 5.9% rate of native-born males of Mexican descent. Id. at 6; see Nicholas
Riccardi, Quiet Border Towns Don’t Live Up to Their Notoriety, L.A. TIMES, May
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can play no role in assessing whether a crime has taken place or is
ongoing.  Accordingly, at least for agents seeking to establish reasona-
ble suspicion outside the border or its functional equivalent, national-
ity should play no role.
Finally, wholly innocent conduct should not be the sole or exclusive
basis upon which to allow border patrol agents to effectuate a stop.
Admittedly, “[l]aw enforcement officers may perceive meaning in ac-
tions that appear innocuous to the untrained observer.”163  However,
when so many of the lawful factors that comprise the reasonable sus-
picion calculus at the border—e.g., vehicle type, looking nervous, fail-
ing to acknowledge law enforcement, nationality, and number of
passengers—are common to so many people, courts should require
agents to articulate some basis to believe criminal activity is inter-
twined with this otherwise lawful conduct.  As the Eighth Circuit has
noted, “[g]eneral profiles that fit large numbers of innocent people do
not establish reasonable suspicion.”164  If the Supreme Court—or
even a modest handful of other circuits—felt similarly, perhaps states
like Arizona would think twice before enacting legislation like SB
1070.  As it stands now, however, that law does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
According to President Obama, the Arizona Act is “irresponsib[le]”
and threatens “to undermine basic notions of fairness that we cherish
as Americans, as well as the trust between police and our communi-
ties that is so crucial to keeping us safe.”165  This may be true, but
blame does not reside exclusively with the Arizona Legislature.  The
Arizona Act is merely the foreseeable consequences of nearly three de-
cades worth of Supreme Court decisions that have gradually increased
the discretionary capabilities of law enforcement.  Nowhere is that
discretion higher than at the border.
The true fix is not at the legislative level.  Sure, federal immigra-
tion reform may prove helpful.  Yet, to avoid “irresponsible” legisla-
tion, the Supreme Court must rearticulate the reasonable suspicion
standard to, consistent with Terry, make clear that officers must be-
lieve that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity.  As part of the
13, 2010, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-border-crime-
20100514,0,7955325,full.story (“Despite the drug war that has claimed
thousands of lives in Mexico, communities along the U.S. side of the 2,000-miles
southern border have shown virtually no increase in crime for several years.”).
163. United States v. Gutierrez-Daniez, 131 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1997).
164. United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Eustaquio, 198 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1999)).
165. Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2010, at A1.
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reasonable suspicion calculus, border patrol agents must not be al-
lowed to take the color of a suspect’s skin into account.  Finally, circuit
and district courts should no longer permit wholly innocent conduct to
constitute the sole or exclusive basis upon which to allow border patrol
agents to effectuate a stop.
